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Political transitions are predominantly analysed from the top down and focus on a
narrow range of political institutions and processes. Critical rethinking of the ‘‘transition
paradigm’’ now incorporates structural factors, such as historical legacies and ethnic
composition(s) when analysing their trajectory(s). In this paper, we intend to
complement top-down approaches by offering a bottom up perspective; revealing
what it means for an ‘‘ordinary’’ person to live through a transition. We use the
Rwandan transition as a case-study. An analysis of over 400 life histories of Rwandan
peasants, and their subjective ranking exercises over time on a ‘‘ladder of life’’, portrays
the path of the Rwandan transition as perceived from below. The ethnicity of the
respondents sheds light on the structural factor underlying the Rwandan transition: the
HutuTutsi ethnic bi-polarity. Their life stories and the results of the subjective ranking
exercise reveal the (perceived) interrelation of power and identity that have structured
and continue to structure the Rwandan socio-political landscape and everyday life,
despite the fact that ethnicity has been ‘‘officially’’ banned from public life.
Keywords: Rwanda; political transition; conflict; ethnicity; life stories
Introduction: the transition paradigm reconsidered from below
The assumption underlying the main literature on political transitions, the so-called
transition paradigm, is that a country shifting away from authoritarian rule is moving or
evolving towards democracy.2 Through reform, compromise or overthrow, the modalities
of the transition are the choice of the main actors  incumbent and opposition e´lite forces 
driving the transition towards its outcome; a (new) democracy. Reconsideration of this
classical paradigm has highlighted some of its major shortcomings based on the
observation that several countries that underwent a political transition failed to
democratize.3 Therefore, these emerging regimes  the outcomes of transition  need to
be situated somewhere in the grey zone4 between authoritarianism and democracy.
The observation that structural features can promote or hamper democratization efforts
was important in understanding why some countries failed to democratize. These
structural conditions include historical and institutional legacies, the economic situation,
social class and/or ethnic make-up. As a consequence Carothers argues:
Democracy promoters are strongly wedded to their focus on political processes and
institutions. They have been concerned that trying to blend that focus with economic or
socio-cultural perspectives might lead to the dilution or reduction of democracy assistance.
And having set up organizations with an exclusively political perspective, it is hard for
democracy promotion groups to include other kinds of expertise or approaches.5
*Email: bert.ingelaere@ua.ac.be
Journal of Eastern African Studies
Vol. 3, No. 3, November 2009, 438463
ISSN 1753-1055 print/ISSN 1753-1063 online
# 2009 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/17531050903273735
http://www.informaworld.com
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
In
ge
la
er
e,
 B
er
t]
 A
t:
 1
5:
05
 2
4 
Oc
to
be
r 
20
09
Principally top-down assessments of the Rwandan transition that started in 1990, its
different phases and its outcome are provided by several authors.6 Multiple factors
influenced the incumbent regime  a so-called development dictatorship that came into
place after the 1973 coup led by Juvenal Habyarimana  to open up and initiate liberal
reforms that should eventually have led to democracy. Domestic opposition forces came
into play, contesting and competing for power that was, until then, mainly centred in the
hands of a Hutu clique from the north of the country. At the same time, a Tutsi-dominated
rebel force, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), started a civil war against the
Habyarimana regime. In August 1993, the Arusha peace agreement established an official
end to the war and sought a compromise between the different parties involved: the e´lite on
the side of the Habyarimana regime, the internal opposition and the armed rebel force
(RPF). The agreement was never implemented since the crash of the plane carrying
Habyarimana unleashed a genocidal campaign against Tutsi civilians and so-called
moderate Hutu who were not in favour of the incumbents’ politics. The RPF resumed its
war and gained a military victory in July 1994 by defeating the government forces and
stopping the genocide. They publicly agreed to respect the Arusha peace agreement and to
continue the political transition with the forces that did not participate in the genocide in
order to achieve power-sharing and democratic institutions. This began a second phase in
the transitional period, officially completed in 2003.
Structural factors, such as historical legacies and/or ethnic bi-polarity, are highlighted
by most of the authors discussing the Rwandan transition. What remains largely
unexplored in the literature on political transitions and the studies on the Rwandan
transition  even when incorporating the critical rethinking of the transition paradigm  is
the experience of transition by the ordinary population. Analysis is predominantly focused
on actions undertaken by members of the political e´lite, the functioning of institutions and
procedural regulations. Local perceptions of socio-political change are not mentioned in
the transition literature. It is important that we incorporate the concrete results of
governance, that is, the tangible life changes in the (perceived) well-being of the population
to understand the nature and assess the outcomes of transitions. Well-being includes
objective and subjective elements so an assessment of the indicators of change should
include measures of how people feel about their lives and perceive the changing socio-
political environment. Narratives of popular agency and perceptions of change are,
therefore, a necessary bottom-up complement to top-down, or macro-oriented under-
standing of a transition. Our objective in this paper is to complement these top-down
approaches with a bottom-up perspective that intends to, ‘‘bring peasants back into an
understanding of the political and social processes of the state’’.7
Processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to shift away from old
socio-political procedures, behaviour, institutions and ideological underpinnings and its
attempts to evolve towards a new order operate in the context of the broader societal
(opportunity) structure. A bottom-up perspective on transition, therefore, entails the
exploration of the dynamic interplay between agency and opportunity structure.8 A society’s
opportunity structure is defined by the broader societal context that is institutional, social
and political; it is the formal and informal context in which people operate. We define
agency as the capacity of an actor to process  perceive and interpret  social experiences
and events. These actors subsequently have the capability to express personal preferences,
make meaningful choices and undertake action.9
We analyse the features of the Rwandan political transition by focusing on
perceptions of socio-political change. Our focal point throughout the analysis is the
central cleavage structuring (or defining) Rwandan society. The ethnicity of respondents
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functions as a pivot. We ask ourselves the question as to whether the perception and
experience of the same reality may differ depending on the identity of those perceiving it.
Long states, ‘‘[ . . .] issues or events are, of course, often perceived, and their implications
interpreted, very differently by the various parties/actors involved. Hence, from the outset
one faces the dilemma of how to represent situations were there are multiple voices and
contested ‘realities’.’’10 Based on more than 400 life-story interviews with Hutu and Tutsi
peasants, and their subjective rankings on a ‘‘ladder of life’’, we shed light on perceived
changes over time.
In what follows, we first explain the nature of the methodology used to collect the data
to offer this bottom-up perspective. Subsequently, we outline the course of historic events
experienced by the ordinary peasant population. This experience illustrates how ethnicity,
the underlying structural factor we keep in mind, not only shaped the transition but also
shapes current perceptions of the Rwandan transition that started in 1990. We finally turn
to the outcome of the transition: that is, the perceptions of living conditions under the
regime that emerged following the military overthrow by the RPF. This is done with a
specific focus on the governancejusticedevelopment nexus that followed the genocide
aftermath in the context of a new political regime.
Fieldwork and methodology
Our research seeks to understand (the experience and perceptions of) processes of
transition and regime change. Rwanda’s political transition started in 1990. We needed,
therefore, the ability to capture the dynamics over a longer period. Moreover, we needed to
come to an understanding of the perceived comparison with subsequent regimes without
directly and explicitly asking respondents. Direct questions of this kind posed by foreign
researchers are not only unwanted by the Rwandan political establishment and adminis-
trative authorities, they would also trigger (mainly) politically correct answers by
respondents.11 The violence experienced during the 1994 genocide and war has destroyed
the Rwandan social fabric, distrust is pervasive. The ensuing and zealous struggle to
eradicate genocide ideology12 equally seeks to counter all utterances not in accordance with
the official ‘‘public transcript’’,13 and has installed a high degree of self-censorship among
the peasant population.14 Therefore, we integrated the following principles and research
strategies in designing the study and during fieldwork: (1) an inductive theoretical drive and
an iterative research process; (2) making observations on both the community (village/
sector) and the individual level; (3) understanding the breadth and the depth of processes;
(4) making use of a rigid sampling framework in order to have variance in the sites for in-
depth study (multi-sited); (5) combining quantitative and qualitative research strategies
(mixed method); and (6) the ability to capture the dynamics of change by adopting a
diachronic perspective through the collection of community and life histories and
subjective rankings over time.15
By adopting these research principles, we approached the topic sideways by collecting
life histories and subjective rankings.16 In so doing, respondents were not aware that they
were not only telling their own story, but equally the story of (a political) transition and
regime change. In 2006, during a pilot for the life story interviews, we conducted 50 full life
story interviews with 30 Hutu and 20 Tutsi respondents from several villages. These
interviews were conducted during several sessions and through open-ended questions
touching on almost every aspect of the interviewee’s life. These initial life story interviews
lasted in total between 7 and 14 hours (spread over several sessions). Based on an analysis
of these narratives we derived a set of questions to be used during shorter interview
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sessions. These interviews lasted between 1.5 and 3 hours and enabled us to cover a larger
sample of respondents in one session. We further grouped these questions into five themes
that corresponded with the different dimensions that matter in life for ordinary people: the
socio-economic situation; the feeling of security; the level of confidence in others (with a
subsection for one’s own ethnic group and that of others), and the feeling of political
representation and personal prospects for the future.17 An analysis of these numerous life-
story narratives enables us to (partially) understand what it means to live through a
political transition, a period of violence and a shift from one regime to another. But apart
from this qualitative or ethnographic research strategy, we added a quantitative element to
the exercise.
During each life story interview, we used a visual aid to assist the respondents in their
assessments of the different periods in their lives (see Figure 1).18 We used this to explore
the different themes identified above: the socio-economic situation; the feeling of security;
the level of confidence in others; and the feeling of political representation. In the life story
interviews, a value of between 5 and5 was given (by the respondent) by pointing to the
appropriate step on the ladder for every year in the adult’s life.
We proceeded as follows. First, the structure of the visual aid was explained: on top of
the ladder are those people who are the best off (wealth), the most secure (security), etc. in
the community of the respondent. (Otherwise the problem would exist that people would
compare themselves with residents of Kigali, for example, obliging them (in their
perceptions) to always choose the bottom steps.) The spatial reference is their own
community: in our field sites this is always rural with predominantly peasant inhabitants.
With communities, we refer to sectors. There exist no villages in Rwanda. People live
dispersed on hills in the countryside and are grouped into administrative units. We define
the local level, a local community, as the proximity of peoples’ everyday lives. This is what
Figure 1. Ladder of life visual.
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happens at the cell and sector level as they existed before the administrative restructuring
of January 2006. When the geographical area, for comparison, was defined and the people
on the top step characterized (step 5), the nature of the bottom step was defined as,
‘‘people who are the worst off in economic terms (step 5),’’ or who ‘‘feel the least secure,’’
or who ‘‘are the least confident in the other ethnic group’’ or their ‘‘own ethnic group’’, or
who ‘‘feel the least politically represented’’ in the community. The enumerators and my
translator were ‘‘trained’’ (and supervised) always to use exactly the same phrasings to
explain the nature of the ladder and its steps in order to avoid heterogeneous
interpretations by the respondents. Equally important is that all respondents have a
similar understanding of the situation/feelings/concepts of economic prosperity, security,
confidence and political representation. First we always asked the respondent to describe in
his/her own words how he/she interpreted the notion of economic situation, the feeling of
security, the degree of confidence and the nature of political representation. Although their
responses make clear that these notions comprise multiple characteristics and one
respondent might pay more attention to one dimension than to another, their phrasings
explaining the themes indicate that all are aware of the range of connotations a notion
entails. Gradual continuity prevails in the semantic understanding of the notions under
investigation; there is no difference in kind in the interpretations.19
Subsequently, the respondents were asked to place themselves with regard to the topic
discussed (e.g. economy, security, etc.) on the ladder in their current situation. We then
moved consistently back in time towards their year of marriage or their first year of adult
life (if single). From that point onwards, we moved forward in time, asking a rating for
every year or period of years. We used the findings from the life-story narrative to help
people recall their situation at a certain moment in time. For example, when someone had
told us that his/her firstborn child was born in 1986, we would refer to 1986 as, ‘‘the year
when your first child was born’’.
It needs to be noted that the scale (i.e. ladder) itself remains fixed throughout the
different periods in time. The fact that the scale remains fixed needs further explanation.
For example, different levels of ‘‘feeling secure’’ or ‘‘being confident’’ always exist as such.
Even when a certain village (at a certain point in time) does not contain people who feel
very secure or totally insecure or totally politically represented or not represented at all,
then the idea and knowledge of what it means to feel totally secure or insecure, or to be
very well represented or to feel not represented at all is still known to the respondent.
Similar reasoning is made by the respondent when applying the scale for the socio-
economic themes.20 The scale functions as a mental map and background against which
the personal movement up and down the ladder of life  the imaginary but stable
situations/levels of the theme explored  is assessed related to a certain theme and point in
time (i.e. in their own life experience) and in comparison with the surrounding environment
(i.e. the spatial reference point).
It is important to note that these narratives and rankings are not indicators of
economic welfare, social cohesion, security and political representation per se, but rather
indicators of the perceptions of these themes. Equally important when interpreting these
findings is realizing that they portray rankings over time; events and periods in the past are
reinterpreted through the lens of events occurring later. The functioning of memory, the
effects of trauma and current government campaigns to alter the peoples’ understanding of
the past in nation-building strategies create biases in ranking exercise responses. Therefore,
several elements need to be taken into account when interpreting the findings. First, there
is no baseline data on these topics; recall is the best way to get at these issues. Second, we
want to understand the experience and perceptions of transition. This is how perceptions
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work: they are influenced by individual experiences in the past and mediated by discourses
produced by the government, media, etc., past and present. It is an element to consider
when interpreting and presenting the results of the rankings. And third, biases that might
exist due to recall activity go in all directions: all respondents are subject to it.
All sites where life stories were collected are situated in rural Rwanda. The selection of
communities (sectors) was guided by the principle of attaining maximum variance.21
Geographic variance in field sites allows for an indicative appreciation of life’s experiences
incorporating various dynamics of historical events, state and societal practices. Field sites
are highlighted on the map (Figure 2). Large dots are places where life stories were
collected; small dots are locations where we also resided but did not collect life histories.
The limitation to six locations does not allow us to claim a representative sample of the
entire Rwandan population. However, the guiding principles applied when choosing
research locations and in the selection of respondents allow for indicative findings and a
grounded understanding.
According to the Rwandan Ministry of Finance, 56.3% of the Rwandan population
were considered poor in 2007.22 Poverty is predominantly a rural phenomenon with 92% of
the poor living in rural areas. Moreover, 87.2% of the entire rural-based Rwandan
population have agriculture as their main economic activity, either as self-employed
farmers or as daily wage labourers. This means that the people dispersed over the Rwandan
hills are predominantly poor and almost all peasants. Apart from the fact that Rwanda is a
peasant society, it is also an ethnic bi-polar society with Hutu and Tutsi as the main ethnic
groups. Nevertheless, due to the violence in 1994 new groups have emerged. During our
fieldwork, we determined five social groups that are clearly identified by local inhabitants.
Figure 2. Field sites.
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Tutsi inhabitants can be divided into genocide survivors and old caseload returnees. The
latter or their parents fled Rwanda after the Hutu revolution in 1959 and returned to
Rwanda after the RPF’s assumption of power in 1994. The population of Hutu inhabitants
in a local setting currently contain released prisoners, those accused in Gacaca courts and
those who are not accused and have never been imprisoned. We compiled lists with the
names of all the household heads in the selected village and asked several groups of key
informants to identify every household according to one of the five group characteristics.
Subsequently, using a stratified random sampling scheme, we selected household heads
from each group to interview (i.e. approximately 70 respondents in every locality).23
Selected persons aged below 30 were systematically replaced, as for our purposes survey
respondents had to have lived through the transition and regime change in a conscious way.
We aggregated the weighted results for each of the five groups across all communities into
a trend line according to ethnic group, Hutu or Tutsi (Table 1).24
We first resided in one of the survey communities between July and September 2004,
and later in all of them between January and July 2006. Between January and June 2005,
brief visits were made to some of the communities while working on another research
project. Life-story interviews were conducted between January and April 2007 when we
resided for shorter periods in the sectors.
Rwanda’s political transition lived from below
Figures 3 to 6 present the aggregated results of a subjective ranking exercise according to
ethnic group. The perceived changes enable us to discern differences and similarities in
perceptions according to ethnic identity. In doing so, we depict the perceived changing
nature of the type of regime and its policies through the lens of ethnicity. For each phase of
the transition, we also include excerpts from peasant narratives to elucidate the perceived
socio-political changes over time. We used the results of the ranking exercise, as presented
in the graphs, to explore the extensive body of life story narratives and identify recurring
themes and underlying motifs. Focusing on the subjective ranking exercise, we analyse the
nature of perceived changes through life trajectories. We juxtapose Hutu and Tutsi
narratives to portray diverging and converging experiences. These narrative blocs and
threads, in their turn, support and elucidate the nature of the ranking exercise results. We
describe the perceived changes while using short quotes from the respondent narratives to
support our interpretations of the ladder of life results. We take a chronological stance.
According to the findings, 4 periods can be identified: 1980s94; 19942000; 200005 and
the current situation from 2005 onwards.25
Table 1. Identity respondents life-story interviews.
Male Female Total
Hutu not accused in Gacaca /never incarcerated 74 62 136
Hutu accused in Gacaca 68 9 77
Hutu released prisoner 58 0 58
Total Hutu 200 71 271
Tutsi Survivor 36 49 85
Tutsi old-caseload returnee 28 25 53
Total Tutsi 64 74 138
All respondents 264 145 409
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End of the 1980s94: the breakdown of an order
Through the rankings, it becomes clear that both Hutu and Tutsi valued the level of well-
being during the 1980s at the height of the Habyarimana regime (at least when looking
back from their current perceptions). Food, as well as territorial security, were then
guaranteed. A Rwandan peasant feels secure when the heart is calm and peaceful. Having
peace of heart (umutuzo w’umutima)), and thus feeling secure, is only possible when several
conditions are met. Security (umutekano) has different dimensions. There is the security of
the stomach (umutekano w’inda) and security of the body and of property or goods
(umutekano w’abantu n’ibintu); the latter is fulfilled when ‘‘one sleeps well’’ (ununtu
araryama agasinzira). There is a clear distinction between territorial or physical security
and psychological security. Territorial security is guaranteed when there is neither war
(ntambara) nor conflict (imidugararo), when one can move freely (kujya aho ushaka), and
cultivate plots of land and/or breed cattle in freedom (uburenganzira).
The rankings by Tutsi in the 1980s are slightly lower, especially regarding the level of
confidence towards the other ethnic group (i.e. the Hutus), and their perception of the
nature of political representation; a consequence of the awareness that their group had
been targeted in the past (i.e. the events of 1959, 196364 and 1973). This was more a latent
awareness of not being fully represented due to the rule of the great Hutu majority
(rubanda nyamwinshi). In that period, Hutu did not make a distinction between their own
ethnic group and the Tutsi. Trust without distinction was omnipresent for them. Tutsi
living outside Rwanda at that time were less confident in the Hutu. Tutsi genocide
survivors recall:
‘‘During that period, the government equally did its utmost to guarantee the peace of the
population, evidently they called us Tutsi, but it didn’t hurt us.’’
‘‘[In 1974], we were very skeptical about the peace brought by Habyarimana, but [later] we
gained confidence in the politics of Habyarimana.’’
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Figure 3. Subjective ranking economic situation (weighted results).
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‘‘In 1963, a lot of Tutsi were killed and houses burned, but afterwards calm returned. In 1973
as well after the take-over of power by Habyarimana, the feeling of security increased. There
was no problem.’’
‘‘In Rwanda [at that time], there were ethnic divisions. One ethnic group was favoured.’’
‘‘[ . . .] Tutsi were not considered in the same way as Hutu, so they didn’t have all the advantages
of Hutu.’’
‘‘They didn’t want Tutsi to have secondary and higher education in order to prevent Tutsi from
having access to power.’’
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Figure 4. Subjective ranking feeling of security (weighted results).
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Figure 5. Subjective ranking feeling of confidence (weighted results).
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‘‘At that time there were people with ‘genocidal ideas’, but they couldn’t put them into practice
because the government didn’t want it at that time.’’
‘‘They [Hutu] had chased us from our country.’’ (Old caseload returnee)
An aspect of political representation is related to how one represents how one governs. It
is about the way power is exercised. It is about governing in an impartial way, preventing
the suffering of any kind of injustice that remains unpunished (Kugukosereza); that one is
not the object of any form of violent behaviour (Guhohoterwa). Even more important is
that the governed do not suffer from prejudice and injustice emanating from the
administration itself (i.e. those who govern), that no one is impeding you from reaching
your goal (Ukubangamira). A preliminary condition to feel represented is that one does not
feel targeted by those exercising power, that one has not the impression that, ‘‘all means are
employed to do you bad’’ (Kukwirunkankiraho).
Feelings of security declined starkly from 1990 onwards, after the RPF attacked
Rwanda. Tutsi living inside Rwanda in particular, now genocide survivors, gradually lost
confidence in their fellow Hutu community members. Some areas were directly affected by
the war. The war culture was pervasive and went together with the introduction of a
multiparty system throughout the country. The existing framework of clearly defined rules
of conduct, social norms and power privileges evaporated. Initially this resulted in the
experience of a multi-polar landscape with threats to the socio-political order coming from
different sides: the Northerners (abakiga) against people from the south (Nduga); members
of different political parties against each other; the RPF versus the Habyarimana regime.
Political parties (amashyaka) used violent practices to recruit new members by liberating
them from their ties with other parties (kubohoza). They formed youth wings that were
later converted into militia gangs to combat other militias and terrorize local authorities.
Existing (MRND) power structures were contested and administrative authorities were
sometimes ousted from their communities. All this resulted in the breakdown of the
existing authority structure that had guaranteed territorial security.
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Figure 6. Subjective ranking feeling of political representation (weighted results).
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In an effort to restore its authority, the Habyarimana regime appealed to ethnic
sentiments and managed to align multiple cleavages dividing the socio-political landscape
with the central cleavage of Rwandan society: the Hutu Tutsi bi-polarity. Tutsi living inside
Rwanda became more and more stigmatized as ‘‘enemies from within,’’ ‘‘cockroaches’’
(Inyenzi) and ‘‘accomplices’’ (Ibyitso) of the RPF, the enemy on the outside of Rwanda
perceived as a Tutsi rebel force eager to undo the achievements of the 1959 Hutu revolution.
Suspected Tutsi accomplices were incarcerated and massacres were instigated in some areas.
The years between 1990 and 1994 were characterized by this mindset of war; diminishing
feelings of security and social cohesion. Not only for people of Tutsi identity but also within
the Hutu group. Distrust, in particular, was intensifying between the ethnic groups.
TUTSI
‘‘The authorities couldn’t solve my problems
anymore, because of the political parties
controlling the situation and looking to recruit
members. They didn’t want Tutsi.’’
‘‘The effects of multipartyism were negative in the
sense that one was harassed because of being a
member of this or that political party.’’
‘‘There was tremendous upheaval.’’
‘‘There were a lot of parties here. We enrolled in
the MRND, the strongest party here [in the
village]. But it didn’t serve us well later on [in
1994].’’
HUTU
‘‘The authorities couldn’t solve the people’s
problems anymore because of the war.’’
‘‘The war had started, the political parties were
fighting over members and the RPF could profit
from this. We were afraid from the Northern
Hutu.’’
‘‘We couldn’t go to Kigali anymore; they called us
Akazu, people on the side of the government in
power.’’
‘‘The youth members of the MDR had prevented
me governing the people of my cell
(neighbourhood).’’
‘‘There was no security because of the political
parties and because of them we had the genocide.’’
‘‘With the arrival of the political parties, the
situation was terrible. Before everyone was
member of the MRND, but then we had the
MDR, CDR, PL, PSD.’’
‘‘Authorities didn’t exist anymore, bandits dic-
tated the law.’’
‘‘We couldn’t sleep anymore, there was no free
circulation allowed due to the violence caused by
partisans of political parties such as the MRND,
the MDR and the CDR.’’
TUTSI HUTU
‘‘Because of the attack of the RPF, there was no
security for Tutsi.’’
‘‘I was afraid, because the Hutu said I was a
member of the RPF.’’
‘‘Those in power were sensitizing the Hutu to kill
the Tutsi.’’
‘‘We were harassed ever since the RPF attacked
Rwanda. Tutsi were killed in Kibilira, Murambi
and Bugesera.’’
‘‘The authorities started discriminating according
to ethnic identity. They were preparing for
genocide.’’
‘‘I was not represented [by the authorities]
because searched after to be killed as an
accomplice (Ibyitso) of the RPF.’’
‘‘There was no security in the country and
especially for Tutsi.’’
‘‘Confidence in Hutu diminished, because they
imprisoned my father as an accomplice of the RPF.’’
‘‘[There was no confidence in Tutsi], because they
were of the same ethnicity as those who caused
the war.’’
‘‘The rumours of war made us lose confidence in
them [Tutsi].’’
‘‘Tutsi were shedding the blood of Hutu.’’
‘‘They [Tutsi] were killing Hutu on the battle-
field.’’
‘‘We pitied Tutsi because they were menaced and
killed, but we also heard on the radio the
atrocities committed by the soldiers of the RPF.’’
‘‘People started to dissociate, Hutu said Tutsi had
brought them war, Tutsi said Hutu were going to
kill them.’’
‘‘The war had started in Umutara [Northern
region] and people could change and become
‘savage beasts’ (Inyamwaswa).’’
‘‘I was afraid at that time, because on the radio
they said the Inkotanyi [RPF] killed people.’’
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19942000: violence as usual
The downing of Habyarimana’s plane on 6 April 1994 started the genocide and widespread
violence throughout the country. Both Hutu and Tutsi reached the lowest point in their
feelings of security according to their current ranking exercise. The regime then in place is
considered to have incited Hutu to kill all Tutsi. Throughout this period of political
transition, war, genocide and regime change, the degree of confidence Tutsi experienced for
members of their own ethnic group remained consistent and high in their current
recollections. On the other hand, the nature and/or degree of internal Hutu cohesion
starkly declined, especially during the genocide. While the intention of killing all Tutsi
clearly stands out as the master narrative of the period between April and July 1994, a
closer look at variations on the periphery (e.g. the micro-administration of the genocide)
reveals the targeting of people from all groups and for various reasons.26
In retrospect, Tutsi survivors remember they regained an acceptable level of physical
security after the assumption of power by the RPF. This stands in stark contrast to the
experience of Hutu in the genocide’s immediate aftermath.
The ranking for perceived political representation by Tutsi is remarkably high
immediately after the RPF took power, especially in contrast to the ranking of Hutu.
This is because the new regime was perceived, by both groups, as being Tutsi-dominated.
The political order had changed completely due to the military overthrow. The rankings
reveal a perceived ethnic reversal of power, at least in the popular experience.
TUTSI HUTU
‘‘We were not human beings anymore being
chased as if we were animals.’’
‘‘The government condemned us to death.’’
‘‘People died like flies.’’
‘‘Chasing Tutsi was authorized by the
government and they asked all Hutu to kill Tutsi.’’
‘‘We were at the mercy of all fanatical Hutu.’’
‘‘In the fight against death, all Tutsi were united.’’
‘‘People were killed, Hutu and Tutsi, because even
wealthy Hutu have been killed.’’
‘‘It was the authorities who gave orders
to kill the others [Tutsi].’’
‘‘The state handed them [Tutsi] over
(Leta Yabatanza).’’27
‘‘There was total anarchy during the
genocide.’’
‘‘We were governed by groups of killers.’’
‘‘I was also afraid of being killed by the
Hutu.’’
‘‘People participated because of Inda Nini
(greed).’’
‘‘Hutu also threatened me because I was
hiding Tutsi.’’
‘‘It was war (ntambara) and I was afraid.’’28
‘‘I could have died at any moment then,
because the war (ntambara) was lethal.’’
TUTSI HUTU
‘‘Security was assured. There were always
soldiers [of the RPA] nearby.’’
‘‘Soldiers were everywhere and in our turn
we traced the criminals [Hutu].’’
‘‘My husband was sought by soldiers of the
RPF who wanted to arrest all male Hutu.’’
‘‘It was a manhunt of the soldiers of the
Inkotanyi [the RPF], killing Hutu.’’
‘‘During the genocide, Hutu chased Tutsi
and after the take-over of power by the RPF,
Tutsi chased Hutu.’’
‘‘We went to Congo and it was possible to
be killed going there and in Congo where
people died like flies.’’
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This ethnically diverging perception of the nature of political representation continues
even now, although Hutu have steadily evolved from a negative appreciation of the nature
of political representation into a positive one. This is mostly due to the fact that violent
practices such as revenge killings, brutal pacification campaigns and large-scale (often)
arbitrary arrests that lasted for several years gradually faded. The year 2000 constitutes a
turning point. In the years following the genocide, Hutu who had fled to Congo first
experienced the violent dismantling of their camps in Congo, followed by massive arrests,
extrajudicial and revenge killings inside Rwanda and a bold Rwandan Patriotic Army
counter-insurgency programme intended to repel the infiltrators (Abacengezi) that had
attacked Rwanda in 1996. The Abacengezi, members of the defeated (ex) Rwandan army
(i.e. the FAR), and Interahamwe-militia infiltrated (especially northern) Rwanda and
attacked Tutsi survivors and old caseload returnees, but also Hutu who had taken up
positions in the new regime. The infiltrators lived among ordinary Hutu peasants who,
consequently, were often targeted as infiltrators by the new regime. Hutu, therefore, felt
insecure for several years without signs of a steady recovery. In the same period,
approximately 130,000 Hutu were incarcerated. Waves of prisoners were released from
2003 onwards. Until then, they had lived in harsh overcrowded prisons with, in their
recollections, the lowest level of security possible.
Although the new regime was perceived as being on the Tutsi side and guaranteed
physical security for genocide survivors, their perceived recovery in the following years was
slow. The loss of family members, homes, belongings, trauma and the destruction of the
social fabric of communities impeded recovery for many years. The genocide, war and its
violent aftermath left communities not only devastated economically, but also deeply
divided along ethnic lines. Accordingly, the degree of confidence in the other ethnic group
dropped dramatically, especially in the recollections of Tutsi respondents. Further, old
caseload returnees coming back to Rwanda in the wake of the Tutsi take-over resettled in
what was, in their eyes, a threatening environment.
‘‘The government was on our side and we
had a feeling of superiority towards the Hutu.’’
‘‘The Tutsi were satisfied with this new regime.’’
‘‘The war was over, there were still tensions
between Hutu and Tutsi, but the government
was on the side of the Tutsi.’’
‘‘In 1995, there were authorities, but I was not
represented.’’
‘‘They incarcerated several innocent persons
and others were killed. So the authorities
made a distinction in the way they governed.’’
TUTSI HUTU
‘‘Those who were not killed due to the war have
been seriously harmed by it (uwo itishe
yaramukomerekeje).’’
‘‘It was as if we were dead (gupfa uhagaze.)’’
‘‘[In the years following the genocide], I regarded
every Hutu as a killer.’’
‘‘I was afraid from the Hutu, they glanced at me
with an evil eye (kureba umuntu n’ijisho ribi ).’’
‘‘Interahamwe were still hiding in the forests.’’
‘‘Hutu were throwing stones on our houses at
night.’’
‘‘Trust in Hutu completely disappeared when I saw
what they had done during the genocide.’’ (Old
caseload returnee)
‘‘I was in the middle as the tongue (Narindi
hagati nk’ururimi).29 When you were for
Kagame, the infiltrators would kill you, when
you were for the infiltrators, the RPA would kill
you.’’
‘‘During the war of the infiltrators, we could
become the target of the soldiers of the RPF or
of the infiltrators.’’
‘‘In the years between 1994 and 2000 a lot of
inhabitants had been killed by soldiers
considering us to be Abacengezi (infiltrators).’’
‘‘I was imprisoned and we were not sure at all
of being alive the next morning, soldiers carried
off people and went to kill them.’’
450 B. Ingelaere
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
In
ge
la
er
e,
 B
er
t]
 A
t:
 1
5:
05
 2
4 
Oc
to
be
r 
20
09
200005: the normalization of daily life
At the end of the 1990s, a normalization of social life takes place, but along the lines that
were established following the initial seizure of power in 1994. The feeling of security
increases for both Hutu and Tutsi, at least security of body and belongings (umutekano
w’umubir n’uw’ibintu). Feelings of food security and security of the stomach (umutekano
muke w’inda) are not widespread.
Ordinary life recommences, especially because overt hostilities on Rwandan soil ceased.
The consequences of the 1994 carnage and the threat of persecution by Hutu infiltrators
diminished for Tutsi, while the terror and violent practices of the new regime targeting
Hutu also decreased. Further, the situations in prisons also improved. Only minor progress
was, however, made concerning the livelihood situations in the countryside, as the ranking
exercise makes clear. This caused insecurity of the stomach for many. The already dire
economic situation worsens during periods of drought and food shortage, for example in
2000. Though suffered by both groups, it is often more pronounced for genocide survivors
since they lost both family and assets: elements to rely on during periods of hardship.
The government made reconciliation a policy objective only after 2000. This was
reflected in numerous ‘‘sensitization campaigns’’ (Ibikorwa byo gukangurira) staged
continuously in rural areas. The ethnic groups, who had initially shared the Rwandan
hills, now lived together again; not reconciled (abiyunze) but in a mode of non-violent co-
existence (kubana).
Although the degree of trust in the other ethnic group increased during this period, the
difference between the nature of confidence in one’s own group and the other remained
high, as can be seen from the results the ladder of life ranking. This ethnic distrust is subtly
reflected in daily life on the linguistic level in statements such as hagati yacu/turi twenyine
(between us  our ethnic group), or hagati yabo/ari bonyine (between them  their ethnic
group). Hutu and Tutsi live together as neighbours in their respective communities, but
Tutsi survivors mostly live together in settlements (imidugudu) erected after the genocide
in the vicinity of their hills of origin. Those who returned from foreign countries  the
TUTSI HUTU
‘‘Operations to kill people diminished.’’
‘‘Time went by and the sentiment to stay alive
intensified.’’
‘‘War is not only bullets, even bad living
conditions can be worse than war.’’
‘‘The war was over, but the war that stayed
was the war against hunger.’’
‘‘In the year 2000, there was scarcity and we
suffered from an empty stomach.’’
‘‘We started to forget the difficult moments we had in
19971999.’’
‘‘Years went by and we were not afraid anymore for
vengeance from the Tutsi.’’
‘‘Certain errors were corrected, like for example, the
arbitrary arrests.’’
‘‘We started cultivating our plots of land and were
sure we would not be violently mistreated (guhoho-
terwa) by anyone.’’
TUTSI HUTU
‘‘The administrators convinced us to live
together, even with the Hutu.’’
‘‘Hutu didn’t look at us anymore with an evil
eye.’’
‘‘There were a lot of sensitization meetings and
gradually we became convinced.’’
‘‘The ethnic tensions diminished and the survivors
soothed their tempers.’’
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so-called old caseload returnees  generally settled in cities or otherwise took housing in
settlements with Tutsi genocide survivors. This has an effect on the flux of those social
interactions most sought-after and qualitatively intense with people sharing the same living
environment and frequenting nearby bars, shops and houses. But the predominant and
most intense interactions with members of their own ethnic group, and its consequences on
the linguistic level, are secondary to the spatial restructuring of hillside life after the
genocide. The massive decrease in trust towards members of the other ethnic group is the
primary cause of the inequality in social interactions between ethnic groups. Both groups
state that by the end of the 1990s, in contrast with the preceding years, the government
started discouraging widespread ethnic distrust that could erupt into overt violence.
In popular perceptions, power and identity remain intertwined as they always have
been in Rwandan history. Strained ethnic relations and a Tutsi hold on (the access to)
power are salient in recollections of the 2003 presidential elections. Tutsi often refer to the
fact that they were free to choose their representatives, while this narrative thread is almost
completely lacking for Hutu. Although a significant number of Hutu will have freely
chosen their representative, in general Hutu were clearly guided in the making of their
choice, sometimes through subtle means and sometimes through overt coercion.
TUTSI HUTU
‘‘They are afraid to attack us because of the
government keeping a watchful eye on us.’’
‘‘I am never going to visit Hutu and they never
come to me, I can’t even ask them for drinking
water.’’
‘‘We need to distance ourselves from the Hutu,
because they can use poison to hurt us. Among
the survivors on the other hand, we share
everything, even our grief.’’
‘‘When we see our victims [genocide survivors],
we think they might seek revenge, but thanks to
the authorities they don’t.’’
‘‘[The] Authority is good, because the victims of
the genocide and their ‘bullies’ (abishi) live
together, they are not chasing each other any-
more.’’
‘‘The Tutsi government has done a lot to unite
Rwandans.’’
TUTSI HUTU
‘‘We elected the authorities of our choice.’’
‘‘During the elections, you could remark sort of
ruptures based on ethnic factions.’’
‘‘A great number of people here didn’t want the
president [Kagame], so a lot of security forces
came for ‘that’.’’
‘‘I saw Hutu didn’t really like us, they said they
didn’t want a Tutsi as president. But we
‘arranged’ ourselves and got our candidate
[Kagame] elected.’’
‘‘We voted for our president because it is thanks
to him that we are still alive.’’
‘‘Since President Kagame took power, we are
very well represented. But it will be necessary to
be very attentive during the next elections [to
keep it that way].’’
‘‘People thought the war would restart.’’
‘‘[In the year of the elections] there was the fear of
a possible war: if Kagame was not elected there
could be reprisals, if he was elected there could be
troubles caused by the Hutu.’’
‘‘We were afraid the elections would not go as the
government had planned and that we would have
problems.’’
‘‘Soldiers were everywhere and a Tutsi could lie to
them about your voting intentions so you would
end up in prison and tortured.’’
‘‘They made us vote by force and we were afraid
for reprisals if the elections didn’t go as they had
planned.’’
‘‘In the voting booth, we were accompanied by
someone else indicating where to place the thumb,
no refusal possible, otherwise . . .’’
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The outcome of the elections was a guarantee of physical security for Tutsi: their
expectations for political representation in the future are conditional on a continuation of
the status-quo. Hutu were also relieved and moved up in their ranking of political
representation, but more because the simmering tensions in the run-up to the elections did
not erupt into violence. Others phrase their experiences in more neutral terms but also
appreciate the stability brought by the ‘‘new’’ elected government in contrast to the
upheavals of the past. The practices of the administration, in general, were appraised in
the years following the elections. The gradual release of prisoners contributed to a more
positive appraisal of the government on the part of the Hutu population, although the
policy created frustration and fear for genocide survivors.
2005 onwards: justicegovernancedevelopment in a new key
Stability and physical security  being able to cultivate the fields, to sleep and eat  is highly
appreciated, and stands in stark contrast to the turmoil of the 1990s. Progress is made
through policies to improve the well-being of the population. But there is a general
perception that policies are often not based on the needs and will of the population and
even run counter to possible improvements, especially those related to the economy. The
nature and functioning of the local governance structure, institutionally consolidated
during the administrative restructuring in the beginning of 2006, contributes to these
grievances.
The fact that the local government has a certain vision and dedication to the
‘‘development’’ of an area is appreciated. They also have the ideas (because of their
education) and the technical capacity to do so.31 Local authorities show great zeal in the
implementation of these objectives in the locality they govern, often surpassing the
capacities of the governed. They have great autonomy in achieving these goals and in
the overall interpretation of national government policies. Moreover, the chain of
accountability goes upwards towards higher authorities and not downwards towards the
population: they are appointed, not elected.32 Subsequently, an ambitious and internally
coherent national ideology and vision is translated to the local level where measures are
TUTSI HUTU
‘‘The Hutu didn’t cause problems after the
election of President Kagame, they only said the
votes were stolen.’’
‘‘I am very well represented, because if the Hutu
are afraid of me it is because of the government.’’
‘‘Without the authorities we would still be
massacred by the Hutu.’’
‘‘[I will feel represented] if President Kagame
stays in power.’’
‘‘[I will feel represented] on the condition that
‘power’ doesn’t change.’’
‘‘Since the end of the genocide we have good
representatives listening to the problems of the
population.’’
‘‘Currently there are Tutsi in power. It was not
them that killed us and can restart.’’
‘‘Calm returned and we regained confidence [in
Tutsi].’’
‘‘I was happy to have a president.’’
‘‘With the reign of Kagame, it’s better with our
representation.’’
‘‘The king does not kill; it’s the people that kill
(Umwami ntiyica, hica rubanda).30
‘‘The authorities started addressing the problems
of the population.’’
‘‘The elected administrators governed us well [in
that period].’’
‘‘President Kagame had liberated some persons.’’
‘‘The head of state calms the survivors, otherwise
all of us would be inside the prisons.’’
‘‘Since 2000, I started cultivating, I could go to
the market and local authorities could solve my
problems.
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taken by coercion irrespective of real-world considerations, and with local authorities often
demanding much from the population. These authorities must respect and adhere to
so-called performance contracts agreed with other authorities occupying positions in
higher administrative levels. These contracts (Imihigo) refer to the capability to show
observers and others that one is capable and competent in the execution of a task.33 Social
engineering has become the modus operandi in statesociety relations, and underlies a wide
range of policy initiatives and practices. Those narratives which reflect a sense of
voicelessness and powerlessness imply that these state interventions are not rooted in
local realities. This is also the case for Tutsi genocide survivors, but to a lesser extent since,
in general, the presence of a political order that guarantees physical safety prevails for
them over the shortcomings of actual policy initiatives.
The identity of power holders in these key positions at the local level and the
(perceived) nature of the exercise of power tend to give an ethnic dimension to grievances.
These statements shed light on the perceived order of things and explain the gap between
subjective rankings over time according to the identity of the respondent: Hutu or Tutsi.
Although state institutions and stated policies are intended to overcome (ethnic) divisions,
in ordinary perceptions, at least, they also perpetuate the cleavages.
HUTU
‘‘They [Tutsi] have all of power and power is on their side. Even when a Tutsi does wrong, one
cannot punish because authorities don’t want to ‘touch themselves in the stomach’ (Kwikora
mu nda)’’.34
‘‘Currently, we have no liberty of expression, what is said is controlled, there are things we do
not dare to say out of fear of being thrown in prison.’’
‘‘Representation is only for some people, the Tutsi, not for the Hutu, we have no right to
speak.’’
‘‘There are Hutu in the administration, but the problem is that when a Tutsi makes an error, he
or she is not punished as a Hutu who made the same mistake.’’
‘‘We Hutu are obliged to keep our cows fenced inside, while Tutsi are free to let them circulate
outside.’’
‘‘[The representatives] take much trouble to help the survivors, but do nothing for the Hutu. It
accentuates the differences between people. The Hutu do not dare to say this in public, but
they envy the privileges allocated to the Tutsi.’’
‘‘They [authorities] install divisions between people; I mean, the Hutu have nothing to say.’’
TUTSI HUTU
‘‘We thought the state was going to help the
survivors, but until now, I haven’t seen any help.’’
‘‘I wish the authorities would listen to the
interests of the population. The state should do
all that is possible to save the people that risk
dying from poverty.’’
‘‘Since the liberation of prisoners, the authorities
don’t want to listen and follow up on my anxiety
caused by these liberated prisoners.’’
‘‘They [political dignitaries] seek a solution for
the problems of the population, but they don’t
want to know what our real problems are. If the
state is not engaging in listening to the problems
of the population, poverty will kill people in the
shortest delay.’’
‘‘They [national authorities] are there [in Kigali],
but they don’t want to come into the countryside
although it is there where there are a lot of
problems.’’
‘‘They come to make us have reunions, but they
ignore completely our well-being.’’
‘‘I can’t say we feel represented, people are dying
from hunger and nobody is taking stock.’’
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‘‘The state needs to stop making distinctions between people so that problems will vanish and
confidence will return.’’
‘‘We are not afraid of the genocide survivors, but we are afraid of the harm we inflicted upon
them [during the genocide]. Today they are strong, they have the power.’’
Within this framework of (perceived) state functioning, the Gacaca courts were installed
to mitigate distrust between Hutu and Tutsi and reconcile Rwanda and Rwandans. From
2000 onwards, an upward trend is visible on the ranking exercise charts. The levelling of this
trend is equally visible from 2005 onwards, the time when the Gacaca courts come to
dominate rural life.35 The Gacaca process should bring reconciliation. Instead, or at least in
its initial or operational phase, the findings on social cohesion presented in the graph
indicate that the degree of trust in the other ethnic group is not improving. The feeling of
security starkly diminishes for genocide survivors and for Hutu who were never imprisoned
but stand accused in their communities. Tutsi and especially genocide survivors feel less
secure since the start of Gacaca, while feelings of security level out for Hutu.
In the aftermath of war and genocide, co-habitation was a necessity as mentioned
above. Life in the countryside is highly pragmatic. Peasants depend on each other in their
daily struggle for survival in mutual impoverishment. Secrets are kept hidden and personal
thoughts are not aired in order not to make enemies in the community. But distrust was
pervasive, lingering under the surface of daily life. Feelings of confidence and security are
often expressed by referring to the heart, as explained above. The heart is the force unifying
the human being. Hearts have changed because of the crimes committed, the violence
experienced and the inhuman acts observed. Reconciliation, therefore, is a matter of the
heart (umutima). Hutu and Tutsi would again share the same living area and partake in
ordinary village activities in a mode of peaceful co-existence. The heart was only tacitly
explored in the years before the installation of the Gacaca courts and without much
discursive content.
Exploring ‘‘the heart of the other’’ would only come into play after 2005, when
Gacaca courts started to operate in every local community, nation-wide. Participation in
the Gacaca sessions has become the basic element to probe the ‘‘heart of the other.’’
State-sanctioned speaking and/or listening to ‘‘the truth’’ has become an important
means to increase the level of confidence between parties that earlier distrusted each
other. Truth is not only an important prerequisite in the restructuring of social
relationships, but is equally the cornerstone of the entire transitional justice framework
in Rwanda. The fact that ‘‘truth’’ in the popular experience, both from the side of Hutu
and Tutsi, is perceived as not surfacing in the Gacaca process explains the levelling out of
the confidence ranking.36 Not only does factual knowledge remain largely absent, but the
TUTSI HUTU
‘‘Before [1994] people shared everything. Today,
that’s finished. Before, a daughter was given for
marriage without verifying the origins of the
husband, while this has become a major concern
currently.’’
‘‘The genocide has killed a lot of Tutsi in Rwanda
and later, the Rwandan army has equally killed a
lot of Hutu. So there is a problem of hatred in the
heart of people from all categories [ethnicity].’’
‘‘The heart of man is far (kumutima w’umuntu ni
kure).’’
‘‘One is confident in others when you can ‘read’
the heart of the other, but since that is impossible;
it is equally difficult to be confident in people.’’
‘‘The face one shows is different from that which
is in the heart.’’
‘‘It is difficult to know what is in the heart of the
other, so I have to be careful.’’
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re-humanization and re-socialization of the other*the healing dimension of truth-
telling*is not easily forthcoming.
Despite Gacaca (or partially because of it), Tutsi survivors continue to situate the
nature of their confidence in Hutu on the lower side of the ladder of life. Tutsi old caseload
returnees are less open in their disapproval of Hutu. They never uniformly experienced the
physical threats and psychological hardships that the genocide survivors experienced
firsthand during the 1994 extermination campaign, but they have not forgotten the course
of history. Hutu suffer more from an overall climate of distrust, especially due to the
denunciation principle through which the Gacaca courts operate. They express a higher
degree of confidence in Tutsi than Tutsi in Hutu, but this is still significantly less than the
in-group cohesion they manifest. Hutu distrust towards Tutsi is more often a result of
government policies that ought to facilitate the reconciliation process, but which obstruct
their own objectives. Hutu situate themselves, on average, on the positive side of ranking
for political representation, feelings of security and confidence in Tutsi. The fact that they
are situated lower than Tutsi respondents should be interpreted in that way.
TUTSI HUTU
‘‘Gacaca made relationships between people
worse.’’
‘‘They [Hutu] confess only partially, they are not
telling the entire truth.’’
‘‘The Gacaca judges are not veracious; they are
accomplices of the criminals.’’
‘‘People are not telling the truth [here]. Survivors
have become liars in front of their perpetrators
and those who confess don’t do it from the depths
of their heart.’’
‘‘Our former neighbours don’t want to tell us how
our family members were killed and who came to
pillage our belongings.’’
‘‘For the Hutu, we greet each other in passing,
but there is no real confidence. They think I will
accuse them in Gacaca for what the other Hutu
have done [in 1994].’’
‘‘To have confidence, you need to be sure people
tell the truth, but they don’t.’’
‘‘The victims also need to tell the truth in their
testimonies without lying because it ‘kills’ con-
fidence.’’
‘‘I have no problem with the genocide survivors,
but the fact that I denounced my neighbours as
accomplices [in crimes during the genocide] has
created conflicts.’’
‘‘A lot of Hutu started fleeing the country since
the start of Gacaca. They are afraid of being
accused.’’
‘‘The inhabitants [of the community] do not trust
each other. They are not united, they are not
telling the truth. It’s the result of the war. Before
the war, people were united and veracious.’’
TUTSI HUTU
‘‘Me, I can’t trust Hutu, they are angry [because
accused in Gacaca], they are like animals.’’
‘‘There are those who still cultivate hatred and
others harbour the genocide ideology.’’
‘‘There is no confidence between people due to
ethnicity.’’
‘‘The government obliges us to live together with
them but we know it, they are very malicious
people, they can still kill us.’’
‘‘They can’t exterminate us massively, but they
can kill us one by one.’’
‘‘How can I be confident when I see that I am
going to die in prison?’’
‘‘Until now they call us Interahamwe, because we
are Hutu.’’
‘‘The state needs to stop favouring some and
punishing others. As long as some feel superior
compared to others, there will be no confidence.’’
‘‘The obstacles for Rwandans are those trials that
are unjust. One ought to leave the ordinary
peasant who didn’t know what was going on [in
1994]. But they do it anyway because they are
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These statements reflect the dominant perceptions depicted in the ethnically divergent
rankings on the ladder of life. But the overall picture also reflects that both Hutu and Tutsi
place themselves on the positive side of the ladder once again (excluding their economic
situation).
Most see this positive trend continuing, subject to the absence of political interference.
For example, that the (perceived) ethnic power balance does not change in the future for
Tutsi (as already mentioned above), or, paradoxically, on the condition that Gacaca is
either over or has reached its goal.
‘‘The Hutu dispelled us from Rwanda in 1959;
they burned our homes, ate our cows and did it
again in 1973, while in 1994 they have killed
almost every single Tutsi. How can I trust
people who behave like animals?’’ (Old caseload
returnee)
‘‘Nothing is possible to restore confidence in the
population, even when you ‘boil an elephant in a
jug’ (niyo wateka inzovu mu rwabya),37 it’s over.’’
judging the Hutu (ethnic) group. Is there a Tutsi
put on trial? They also killed, but you can’t accuse
them. If someone stands upright in his state, you
can’t do anything against him (Iyo umunu ahagaze
muri Leta ye, nta kindi wakora).38
‘‘They [Tutsi power holders] can use [make] us
[Hutu] as their servile instrument(s) (Bashaka
kutugira ibikoresho).’’39
‘‘The cry is not combating the drum (Induru
ntirwana n’ingoma).’’40
TUTSI HUTU
‘‘I noticed there are some Hutu who have very
human sentiments, more than some Tutsi.’’
‘‘Gacaca has done something for me. It is a sort
of connecting-piece between the victims and
perpetrators. There are people of all sorts. Those
who tell the truth, others lie and even more just
say nothing. But somehow people are together to
talk.’’
‘‘I am confident in people. I pardoned them, but I
am most confident in those who pray together
with me. I (re)gained confidence in Hutu. I am
often together with them in their ceremonies
where I play an important role.’’
‘‘The genocide survivors said [during Gacaca]
that I did not play any role during the genocide.
So, in a certain way, I regained confidence in
them.’’
‘‘I started having good relationships with every-
one, the year that my husband was liberated from
prison.’’
‘‘After my liberation, not one genocide survivor
has treated me badly although it was my
expectation when still in prison. The programme
of unity and reconciliation will continue and be
fruitful.’’
TUTSI HUTU
‘‘Maybe the children will live in harmony
because the teaching of hatred that divided
Rwandans is over, but the adults will die with
their divisions.’’
‘‘In order for people to be totally unified,
Gacaca should continue because it will restore
confidence.’’
‘‘If Gacaca is finished, I think Hutu will hate us
less.’’
‘‘When Gacaca will be over, the situation will be
good.’’
‘‘[After 2010] Gacaca will be finished and this will
bring calm in the population. Tensions between
people will diminish.’’
‘‘If Gacaca finishes and I am not put in prison
again, confidence towards Tutsi will increase
again.’’
‘‘[In the future] Gacaca will be over and we will see
that it is not good to have conflicts and bad
relationships.’’
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The conditionality of expectations towards the future reveals a high level of
uncertainty. It signals that life is still very fragile. This fragility is not only the result
from violence experienced (past and present  overt and covert), it is equally a consequence
of the popular understanding of the course of Rwandan history. The findings presented
here reveal a glimpse of the ‘‘underneath of the things’’,41 the undercurrents of ethnicity
linked to power, at least in the perception of the ordinary peasant.
Conclusion: a cartography of power and identity
We didn’t explicitly ask respondents to make a comparison between pre- and post-genocide
Rwanda. But the findings from the subjective ranking exercise and the accompanying
narratives give us an opportunity to glimpse at what it means to live through a political
transition, from one regime into another, from peace into violence into peace. In this paper,
we restricted ourselves to exploring a structural feature underlying the Rwandan transition:
ethnicity. The graphs with rankings illustrate the (perceived) trajectory of this transition.
The most striking element in the ranking exercise is this reversal of perceived ethnic
dominance. While Hutu had the upper hand before 1994, Tutsi are on top in the post-
genocide rankings. Hutu are more confident than Tutsi, but feel less represented politically.
Tutsi, on the other hand, score high for political representation after 1994, though in their
minds they live in a hostile social environment consisting of the untrustworthy Hutu in
their communities or outside Rwanda. The reversal of dominance is most visible in the
scores on the feeling of political representation and security, the latter hinging on the
former, since feelings of security emanate from the perceived nature of power. It is here that
ethnicity comes into the equation.
By looking at power in Rwanda, in its overt manifestations and in its disguises, we can
interpret this change. An insight in the nature of governance on the periphery of society is
needed. Although state institutions and state policies are intended to overcome ethnic
divisions, they also perpetuate  at least in many ordinary people’s perceptions- the very
cleavages they are supposed to eradicate.42 The results of the ranking exercise reveal the
perceived interrelation of power and identity that structured and continues to structure the
Rwandan socio-political landscape and everyday life. Previously, several authors have
explored this theme; often in attempts to understand the causes of the genocide. The
ideological underpinnings of the Rwandan Republics (196373 and 197394) ‘‘constituted
both a reversal and a continuation of [these] long-standing psycho-cultural images’’43 of
the foreign, racially superior Tutsi pastoralist and native, inferior Hutu cultivator that had
been reinforced under colonial rule. Hutu and Tutsi remained distinct categories after the
social revolution, but Tutsi now became inferior creatures in a newly regained natural
order of Hutu homogeneity.
Apparently, the current rankings reveal a similar process at work in post-genocide
Rwanda despite the fact that ethnicity has been officially ‘‘abolished’’: the reversal and
continuation of long-standing psycho-cultural images. It is a result of the micro-politics of
power, how power has been institutionalized and practised and how it was/is exercised in
its ideological or hegemonic mode.44 It is also about how power is culturally constructed,
In the future, I think security will be good, but
there are people on the outside [Hutu refugees]
that might want to return and disturb our
security.’’
‘‘I don’t think they will stop their ‘bad’ operations
of killing and incarcerating people in the future.’’
‘‘If the imprisonments continue, this will cause
insecurity, because a lot of people are not satisfied.
It can provoke another war.’’
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and has been historically transferred. Although history and culture should not function as
a deterministic explanatory framework, they render actions and events meaningful for
those involved but often overlooked: the ordinary peasants of the Rwandan hills who
perceive and experience the nature and exercise of power from the periphery of society.45
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Notes
1. Previous versions of this paper were presented at AEGIS European Conference on African
Studies, July 1114 2007, Leiden, the Netherlands and at the conference: ‘‘Deepening Democracy
in a Fragmented Society,’’ 1921 September 2007, University of the Western Cape, Cape Town,
South Africa and during a master class with Michael Woolcock (The World Bank), Institute of
Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp, September 26, 2007.
2. Huntington, The Third Wave.
3. Carothers, ‘‘The End of the Transition Paradigm.’’
4. Ibid., 10.
5. Ibid., 16.
6. On the Rwandan transition between 199094, see: F. Reyntjens, L’Afrique des Grands Lacs en
Crise; Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis; Guichaoua, Les Crises Politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda;
and Lemarchand, Managing Transition Anarchies. On (mainly) the second phase of the
transition, see Reyntjens, ‘‘La Transition Politique Au Rwanda,’’ Reyntjens, ‘‘Rwanda,’’ Nifosi,
‘‘A New Conceptual Framework on Political Transitions,’’ and Rafti, A Perilous Path to
Democracy.
7. Newbury and Newbury, ‘‘Bringing Peasants Back In,’’ 874.
8. Our discussion of ‘‘structure’’ and ‘‘agency’’ is based primarily on Narayan, Empowerment and
Poverty Reduction, xviixxiii; Narayan, ‘‘Conceptual Framework and Methodological Chal-
lenges,’’ 338; and Long, Development Sociology.
9. Long states, ‘‘The notion of agency attributes to the individual actor the capacity to process
social experiences and to devise ways of coping with life, even under the most extreme forms of
coercion. Within the limits of information, uncertainty and other constraints (e.g. physical,
normative or politico-economic) that exist, social actors are ‘knowledge-able’ and ‘capable’. They
attempt to solve problems, learn how to intervene in the flow of social events around them, and
monitor continuously their own actions, observing how others react to their behaviour and
taking note of various contingent circumstances.’’ Long, Development Sociology, 16.
10. Long, ‘‘Agency and Constraint, Perceptions and Practice,’’ 34.
11. For an overview of the difficulties understanding Rwanda, see Ingelaere, Do We Understand Life
After Genocide? The theme of knowledge construction in Rwanda was extensively explored in
Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda.
12. Republic of Rwanda, Genocide Ideology. Footnote 5 to 7 in the report (p. 17) give concrete
examples of ‘‘genocide ideology’’ and reveal its wide-ranging scope.
13. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance.
14. The Kinyarwandan word ‘‘Kwibwizira’’ entails this idea of auto-censorship. It expresses the
image that ‘‘common’’ people, without coercion, do what authorities want them to do without
the latter asking them to do so.
15. More detailed information on research design and methodology is explained in Ingelaere, Living
the Transition, 720.
16. Apart from the life story interviews and subjective rankings we present in this paper, we also
employed several other research strategies: survey interviews; semi-structured interviews; focus
group discussions on a number of themes; archival research; and observations of daily life,
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political organization and Gacaca activities. In total, we spoke with over 1400 ordinary Rwandan
peasants and resided for more than 20 months in 10 selected Rwandan villages.
17. The above-mentioned elements can be considered as the dimensions of life that matter for
ordinary people. They are also reflected in the findings from large-scale research that aimed to
establish the different dimensions of ‘‘well-being’’ and the ‘‘good life.’’ Those identified included:
material, physical and social well-being; security; and freedom of choice and action (see the
World Bank study by Narayan, Voices of the Poor). They refer equally to the different
dimensions of the concept of ‘‘human security’’ that shifted the attention from the territorial
security of nation-states towards the security of people. The main characteristics of ‘‘human
security’’ were summarized in the 1994 World Development Report as economic, food, health,
environmental, personal, community and political security. UNDP, World Development Report,
2246.
18. Inspired by Cantril, The Pattern of Human Concerns.
19. See Ingelaere, Living the Transition, 1719.
20. Ibid., 1013.
21. Ibid., 1921. A procedure modelled on the works of, for example, Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and
Civic Life and Gibson and Woolcock, Empowerment.
22. Republic of Rwanda, Preliminary Poverty Update Report.
23. Some communities did not have old caseload returnees, others did not have released prisoners.
24. Exploring ethnic identities is a sensitive issue in post-genocide Rwanda. However, identifying
people according to identity markers such as rescape´, non-rescape´, liberated prisoner, returned
refugee or accused in the gacaca courts is possible. These identity markers correspond with ethnic
identities. During the actual life story interviews it was possible to verify the actual ethnic
identity of the respondent. If the respondent did not belong to the ethnic group expected based
on initial identification, he or she was re-categorized. Mutual trust between the respondents, the
researcher and the Rwandan research collaborators increased over time because: (1) interviews
took place in the respondent’s house (a familiar environment), and (2) since 2004 we had spent
long periods in their communities before the collection of life stories began in 2007.
25. The graphs and the ‘‘ethnic’’ quotes are the master devices used to portray the experience and
perception of ‘‘transition.’’ Even though Rwanda is a bi-polar society with ethnicity as the master
cleavage structuring historical events, the danger of reification exists when reducing the
complexity of identity to binary ethnic markers and subsuming a variety of experiences under
two ethnic categories. Therefore, the master narrative needs to be anchored in other dimensions:
(1) rankings across ethnic subgroups; (2) extended life stories; (3) local community (village)
histories; and (4) overarching structural features (i.e. the regime’s attributes at different moments
in time). These interlocking realities are explored further in Ingelaere’s Living the Transition
(2657).
26. This theme is further explored in Ingelaere, ‘‘Changing Lenses,’’ 389414.
27. The expression refers to pre-colonial Rwanda. When someone had been condemned by the king
and he had to be handed over to the executioner(s), the expression ‘‘Umwami Yamutanze’’ was
used. In the context of the 1994 genocide, it signifies that the State handed over Tutsi to the Hutu
to be executed.
28. Hutu often use the word ntambara (war) when referring to the genocide, as they see it as part of a
larger/longer period of war.
29. The expression refers to the fact that danger came from two sides. The tongue is caught in the
middle between two rows of teeth.
30. Expression referring to pre-colonial Rwanda and indicating that Rwandans are, in general, of the
opinion that bad things and practices are not due to the ruling(s) of the highest ‘‘chefs’’ (king or
president), but rather the lower ‘‘chefs’’ and people in the entourage of the ruler.
31. Personal capacity or power [ububasha] to achieve something in life is often phrased in terms of
having ‘‘ideas.’’ Lack of ideas and intellectual capacity implies the incapacity to move up in life.
32. In several locations local authorities have been replaced by the central administration as the
former failed to implement government policies.
33. Apparently, the concept of ‘‘Imihigo’’ refers to the ‘‘heroism’’ of the soldier in Rwandan culture
and history. The soldier attempts, through his actions in combat, to show his competence and
capability as a ‘‘hero.’’ Recently, performance contracts are also being signed with individual
peasants. See The New Times, ‘‘Performance Contracts to be Signed at Household Level,’’
November 19, 2007.
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34. This expression means that one doesn’t want to sanction someone from one’s own family or
group. The word stomach means coming from the same womb.
35. For an analysis of the conception, nature and functioning of the Gacaca court system, see
Ingelaere, ‘‘The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda’’; Waldorf, ‘‘Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity’’; and
Clark, ‘‘Hybridity, Holism, and ‘Traditional’ justice.’’
36. For a more comprehensive insight into the problematic quest for the truth in the Gacaca process,
see Ingelaere, ‘‘Does the Truth Pass Across the Fire without Burning?’’
37. Signifying that even when you do the impossible one will never restore confidence in the
population. An expression with an identical signification is, ‘‘niyo wateka ibuye rigashya’’  when
you cook a stone until it becomes eatable.
38. Signifying that one cannot do anything against a person who feels strong because they are very
well represented by the government. It gives the person who feels represented in this way the right
to do whatever he or she wants and those who undergo his injustice can’t do anything about it.
39. Expression referring to the feudal period when the Hutu worked as servants for Tutsi.
40. The drum refers to the idea of power. Power is symbolized by the drum in Rwandan custom. The
expression signifies that no matter how many people try to shout, make noise and do other things
to circumvent the will of power, power will always prevail. The one who has power who has the
drum in his hands  will always reach his goal, despite the popular will.
41. Ferme, The Underneath of Things.
42. Gledhill, Power and its Disguises.
43. Uvin, Aiding Violence, 33.
44. An in-depth discussion of the nature of the power structure(s) established through the
consolidation of the political transition in Ingelaere, ‘‘Peasants, Power and Ethnicity.’’ The
crystallization and the (changing) nature of ethnic identities in Rwanda are of central importance
in the work of Catharine Newbury and David Newbury. See: Newbury, The Cohesion; Newbury
‘‘Ethnicity in Rwanda’’; Newbury and Newbury, ‘‘A Catholic Mass in Kigali’’; Newbury,
‘‘Understanding Genocide.’’ Both Catharine and David Newbury’s writings on ethnicity and the
importance of the factor of power were instructive in the understanding of the rankings
presented in this paper. See Newbury and Newbury, ‘‘A Catholic Mass,’’ 313: ‘‘The paradox is
that ethnicity was simultaneously the product of politics and yet, at times, a powerful
determinant of the shape of political culture.’’
45. Chabal and Daloz, Culture Troubles; and Gledhill, Power and its Disguises. For the Rwandan
context, de Lame notes, ‘‘Rwandan mentalities are still imbued with a spiraling conception of
time, as shown by the pervading ideological recourse to (considerably falsified) history to justify
the present (Des Forges 1995). Any important new event harks back to a similar, earlier period,
especially when it touches on historical identity. [ . . .] being unique, the source of power remains
incompatible with shared authority, be it cohabitation with a rival or the republican separation
of powers.’’ de Lame, A Hill Among a Thousand, 482.
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